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Abstract
By specializing Monteros (2002) model to an oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic
abatement costs, we extend his comparison of the incentives to invest in R&D under emission
and performance standards by solving for a closed form solution of the underlying two-stage
game. This allows for a full comparison of the two instruments in terms of their resulting
propensity for R&D and equilibrium industry output. In addition, we incorporate an equi-
librium welfare analysis. Finally, we investigate a three-stage game wherein a regulator sets
a socially optimal emission cap under each policy instrument. For the latter game, while
closed-form solutions are not possible, we establish that the resulting welfare is always larger
under a performance standard.
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1 Introduction
Due to the increasing importance of environmental issues, a large body of theoretical work
has emerged in recent years to examine the performance of environmental policy instruments
by means of the incentives these instruments provide to invest in R&D. Requate (2005) o¤ers
a detailed survey of studies investigating the performance of the usual regulatory instruments
in various market structures allowing for market power in the hands of polluting rms.1 The
study of particular interest to us is Montero (2002), who considers a basic and very general
model of a two-stage game under four di¤erent regulatory regimes. The basic two-stage game
entails Cournot rms that decide on R&D levels for improved abatement technology in the rst
period, and then compete in Cournot outputs in the second stage. The four regulatory regimes
under which rms operate consist of two command-and-control policy instruments, emission and
performance standards, and two market-based instruments. With all four policy instruments
exogenously set, Monteros analysis concludes that, due to the presence of strategic e¤ects, the
command-and-control instruments may o¤er greater incentives than market based instruments,
contrary to what had been claimed previously.
Monteros reliance on a general model of a Cournot market carries the usual benets of
robustness of conclusions and elegance of the underlying analysis. However, in the present case,
coupled with the perhaps overly ambitious goal of comparing four di¤erent instruments, it also
leads to the impossibility of a fully-edged comparison, and thus to the abscence of clear-cut
answers to some desirable questions. The main purpose of the present paper is to consider two of
Monteros models under a standard oligopoly specication that allows for an elementary, more
detailed, and in-depth analysis, and thus provides clear-cut answers to some of the interesting
comparisons left out by Montero (more on this below).2 We focus on the models with the
emission and performance standards, in order to fully analyze the R&D incentives that these
two policy instruments o¤er, in a comparative perspective.
Though clearly a central question in environmental economics, the comparison between stan-
1A very partial literature listing would include the following studies: Downing and White, 1986; Jung, Krutilla
and Boyd, 1996; Malueg, 1989, Milliman and Prince, 1989; Benchekroun and Van Long, 1998, and many others.
2 Importantly, the questions of existence and uniqueness of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
for the four di¤erent games analysed by Montero (2002) have not been addressed, and probably constitute very
challenging issues in themselves. These issues can end up being crucial for the well-foundedness of the models at
hand, e.g., for some of the properties of equilibria, including their comparative statics properties.
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dards and market-based instruments is beyond the scope of the present paper. There are several
di¤erent motivations behind this choice. The rst is real-world relevance: For better of for worse,
the command-and-control regime is known to be the dominant policy approach to environmental
regulatory design (see e.g., Hueth and Melkonyan, 2009).3 The second is of a more practical
nature, reecting a simple wish to avoid an overly lengthy, heterogeneous, and unfocused paper.
Importantly, the structure of the two games corresponding to the two standards is quite simi-
lar, but very di¤erent from the structure of the games corresponding to the two market-based
instruments.4
As in Montero (2002), the specic abatement technology we consider throughout the paper
is end of pipe abatement.5 The contribution of the present paper to the analysis of the R&D
incentives generated by the regulatory standards is two-fold. First, the present paper focuses on
a standard specication of Cournot oligopoly, with linear demand, production and abatement
costs. By adopting specic functional forms, we forsake generality but can derive some relevant
fully-edged equilibrium properties and more transparent comparison results for the two-stage
games. In particular, we provide a complete characterization of the comparison between the
propensities for R&D and for higher output generated by each of the two policy instruments.
This enables us to fully assess the market features under which each instrument is superior in
terms of generating more R&D investment and more output. In contrast, Montero considers a
Cournot framework that is so general that one cannot conduct a full-edged equilibrium analysis
of the underlying two-stage games. Thus, in particular one cannot infer the extent to which the
incentives to invest in R&D vary with the parameters of interest (such as the level of demand,
the emissions ceiling and the R&D cost parameter). Instead, Montero uses as a criterion for
3For further and more detailed discussion of the fact that the regulation of environmental risk is dominated by
the use of standards, the reader is referred to Viscusi et al. (2000) and Harrington et al. (2004). Nevertheless, this
state of a¤airs often does not reect economistsviews on the normative merits of the two types of instruments.
4One implication of this fact is that, even with our simple specication, a four-way comparison appears possible
only via numerical simulations. The di¤erence in structure across the two types of games also raises some issues
as to the very meaning of some of the comparisons.Finally, the di¤erence in model structure also means that the
appropriate functional forms might not be the same.
5There are multiple ways of modeling R&D in an environmental setting (see e.g., Amir et al., 2008). The
main alternative to end of pipe technology is the use of cleaner technologies of production, which lead to a
lower emissions-output ratio. Whether the conclusions of the present paper extend to this R&D technology is an
interesting topic for future work, but beyond the scope of this paper.
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comparison rmsincentives to invest in R&D as measured by its marginal payo¤ to R&D in
the two-stage game, conditional on a second-stage Cournot equilibrium.
To describe the second contribution of this paper, recall that Montero (2002) does not rank
the regulatory instruments with respect to total welfare. In his paper, the planner enforces ex-
ogenously given, and mutually consistent, aggregate pollution constraints for the two scenarios.
In this regard, the present paper extends Monteros analysis in two separate but related exten-
sions. We rst compare the levels of equilibrium welfare generated by the two policy instruments
in the two-stage game. In a more substantive modication, we endogenize the regulatory stan-
dards in a three-stage game via the inclusion of the social planner as a player in an additional
stage at time 0, with the other two stages remaining as before. The objective of the social
planner is social welfare maximization.
Taking into account the objective of the regulator enables a full equilibrium analysis, hence,
a comparison of the actual welfare implications of rmsadoption of new abatement technologies
under imperfect competition. As argued by Requate (2005), incorporating welfare in the equi-
librium analysis is important as it may lead to quite di¤erent results regarding the performance
of the regulatory instruments. Thus, by providing such an analysis within the aforementioned
specication, the present paper can be viewed as complementary to Monteros work. As can be
easily expected, the three-stage game at hand would not be tractable under Monteros broad
level of generality.6
We now preview the results of the present papers. We start with the solution to the two-stage
games, for which the emission targets are exogenously set. Conrming the results of Montero
(2002), we show that the levels of R&D investment and output generated under each policy
instrument depend on the underlying market and R&D parameters. Going beyond Montero,
however, we use the simple specication of our model to provide a complete description of
parameter regions for which each instrument is superior to the other in terms of generating
more R&D investment and more industry output, respectively. We nd that neither of the two
command-and-control instruments is uniformly superior in providing more incentives for R&D in
abatement technology or for more industry output. Moreover, we compare the resulting welfare
levels under the two policy instruments and demonstrate via specic numerical examples that
6Even for our simple specication, the basic three-stage model is not as analytically tractable as the two-stage
games we investigate.
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this comparison can go either way.
In contrast, for the three-stage game in which the regulators objective is to maximize social
welfare, we establish that the performance standard is welfare superior to the emission stan-
dard. This conclusion is consistent with real-life observation, in the sense that the performance
instrument is commonly chosen by regulators (Bruneau, 2004, p. 1194; Requate, 2005, p.178).
In light of this positive and clear-cut result, we conclude by emphasizing the importance that
endogenizing the regulatory standard via a social welfare objective has for the optimal choice of
environmental policy instruments (Requate, 2005).
In terms of the limitations of our analysis, it is clear that the reliance on the standard speci-
cation of a linear oligopoly raises the usual issues of potential non-robustness of the conclusions
to other plausible specications. Nevertheless, this specic setting is intended as a complement
to Monteros (2002) general approach. As noted earlier, due the the usual complexities associ-
ated with strategic behavior, the latter approach has yielded limited insights precisely because
of its level of generality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the basic model.
Section 3 provides the analysis of the two-stage game under the emission and performance
standards. The extension to the three-stage game is given in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries of the model
Consider a duopoly market with three agents: two ex-ante symmetric prot maximizing
rms and a regulator. In the absence of any environmental regulation, rm i produces quantity
qi at no cost, so that the aggregate quantity produced in the market equals Q = qi + qj , for
i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j, and the (inverse) demand function is given by P (Q) = a  bQ, with a; b > 0.7
Since production of rm i leads to qi units of emissions, which cause damage to the environment,
rm i becomes subject to environmental regulation.
To reduce the level of pollution in the environment, the regulator has a choice of one of two
7 In analogy to Montero (2002), we abstract away from the production cost to concentrate solely on the e¤ects
of new abatement technology on abatement cost. The impact of increasing marginal cost on the R&D incentives
has been considered by Bruneau (2004), who, however, investigates this impact only in perfectly competitive
output markets.
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command-and-control policy instruments: Emission or performance standards. The emission
standard constrains the level of pollution generated by rm i to be under an upper limit ei,
while the performance standard imposes a restriction on rm i0s maximal ratio of emissions per
output, hi = ei=qi. The aim of the regulator is to restrict the total emissions generated in the
market, E = ei + ej , and, thereby, to reduce the resulting environmental damage. The damage
is posited to be given by D(E) = sE2=2, where s > 0, a common and convenient specication
reecting the fact that per-unit damage increases with the emission level.
Whenever rm i exceeds the pollution standard imposed by the regulator, the rm is under
the obligation to abate the excess emissions and incur the corresponding abatement cost. The
latter is given by a function C(yi; xi) = (c xi)yi for rm i, where c > 0 is the constant marginal
abatement cost; yi denotes the amount of emissions abated, and xi denotes investment in R&D.
This simple specication reects the general feature that the abatement cost function of rm i
increases in the amount of emissions abated, given by yi = qi   ei for the emission standard,
and by yi = qi(1   hi) for the performance standard, with hi 2 (0; 1)8. In addition, the R&D
investment, xi, improves the abatement technology of rm i by reducing its unit abatement cost.
To describe the R&D process, we assume that the R&D technology is deterministic and
reects diminishing returns to R&D expenditures. For convenience, we postulate that the cost
of reducing the constant marginal abatement cost by xi  0 follows a quadratic function, namely
g(xi) = x
2
i =2, where  > 0:
9
For polluting rms, there are several di¤erent ways of modeling R&D in abatement technol-
ogy. Implicit in this description of environmental R&D is the fact that that the rms reduce
their emissions by undertaking end-of-pipe abatement. Indeed, the objective of environmental
R&D here is to reduce the cost of pollution abatement.10
8We do not consider the extreme cases, in which hi = 0 and hi = 1; since they imply that rm i does not emit,
or yi = qi, and that it does not abate, or yi = 0, respectively.
9Due to its tractability, the quadratic R&D cost specication is quite standard (e.g., dAspremont and
Jacquemin, 1988 and Amir, 2000).
10Another common alternative way to introduce environmental R&D is to allow rms to use cleaner technologies
to comply with environmental regulation. In this case, environmental R&D would aim at reducing the ratio of
emissions per output. Whether the main results of the present paper extend to this type of environmental R&D
is an open question of substantial interest. Recent results on some hitherto unknown di¤erences between the two
types of R&D indicate that the answer to this question requires some substantive analysis (see Amir et al, 2008,
Baumann et al., 2008 and Baker et al., 2008 and Brechet- Jouvet, 2008, for more on this important point).
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For each of the two types of pollution constraint imposed by the regulator, the two-stage
game under consideration unfolds as follows. In the rst stage, the two rms simultaneously
choose their environmental R&D investments. In the second stage, they compete by choosing
output levels (à la Cournot) upon observing the two rst stage R&D decisions.
3 The two-stage game
It is common in the literature on the merits of environmental policy instruments to postulate
that the emission constraint is exogenous, implying that the regulator is not an active part of
the model. In addition, due to the lack of tractability of his general formulation, Montero (2002)
does not base the performance comparisons on equilibrium levels of R&D in the four di¤erent
games, but on the marginal prot to R&D for each xed possible level of R&D. This pointwise
comparison criterion might be too demanding, and the ambiguity in the resulting comparisons
might well be due to the stringency of this criterion. With the goal of obtaining more clear-cut
comparisons, we relax this criterion to compare only the equilibrium R&D values, which clearly
form the only relevant levels for each model.
To this end, we exploit the tractability of our simple formulation and solve for the equilibrium
of the two-stage game via backwards induction. Thus, we assume that rms correctly anticipate
the equilibrium level of output, when deciding on their level of R&D investment to maximize
prot. Moreover, we make the following assumption:
(A1): 9b > 8; 9b > 4a=c; a > 2c:
These parameter restrictions ensure that the solutions to the two-stage games are economically
meaningful, yielding positive levels of abatement cost and output and ensuring that the level of
emissions is below that of output.11
3.1 The emission standard
In this model, the regulator imposes a cap on the level of emissions that a rm can generate
via its production. Since the rms are symmetric, we assume that the regulator sets the same
emission ceiling, e, for both rms. In the second stage of the game, rm i chooses its own
11 In addition, this assumption gets rid of potential technical di¢ culties and long computations (that a priori
have no particular economic content of interest) associated with boundary equilibrium solutions.
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output, qi; and the nal level of emissions (after abatement), ei, to maximize its prot given
the levels of e, its R&D investment xi 2 [0; c], and its rivals output, qj (recall that c > 0 is the
unit abatement cost). Thus, the total emissions abated by the rm equal qi   ei. Hence, the
optimization problem of rm i in this stage is given by
max
qi;ei
qi[a  b(qi + qj)]  (c  xi)(qi   ei) s.t. ei  e: (1)
Since the objective function in (1) is increasing in ei, ei = e is set, and the prot-maximization
problem reduces to
max
qi
qi[a  b(qi + qj)]  (c  xi)(qi   e); (2)
which leads to equilibrium individual outputs qi(xi; xj;e), for i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j: 12
In the rst stage, the rms simultaneously choose their R&D investments, xi and xj , given
e and the equilibrium in the second stage. Thus, rm i solves the following problem
max
xi
qi(xi; xj ; e) [a  b(qi(xi; xj ; e) + qj(xi; xj ; e))]  (c  xi)[qi(xi; xj ; e)  e]  x
2
i
2
: (3)
The last term in (3) denotes the cost that rm i incurs when investing the amount of xi in R&D.
Due to the symmetry of the game, this stage leads to a symmetric equilibrium, fully described
by the level of R&D investment, x(e); and output, q(e). For this equilibrium, we require that
0 < e < 3(a c)9b 1 ; to ensure that our results are economically meaningful (i.e., this assumption
ensures that the levels of abatement cost and output are positive, and that the level of emissions
is below that of output).
Lemma 1 Under assumption (A1), there is a unique symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the two-stage game under the emission standard, with equilibrium R&D and outputs levels
respectively given by
x(e) =
4(a  c)  9be
9b   4 and q(e) =
3(a  c)  3e
9b   4 :
Moreover, 0 < x(e) < c and 0 < e < q(e):
The next section provides a solution to the two-stage game under the performance standard.
12The assumptions of this model imply that equilibrium does not depend on e in this stage, hence, we have
qi(xi; xj) for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j.
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3.2 The performance standard
A performance standard refers to a cap, h, which the regulator imposes on the proportion of
pollution that a rm can emit per unit of production. For instance, if the regulator chooses
h = 0:7, the rms emissions can at most amount to 70% of its output. Hence, if q = 100,
emissions must be reduced to 70, so that q(1  h) = 30 units of emissions must be abated.
Given a choice of h by the regulator, xi from the rst stage, and rival output qj ; the prot-
maximizing rm i solves in the second stage the following problem:
max
qi
qi[a  b(qi + qj)]  (c  xi)qi(1  h); (4)
where the equilibrium output in this stage is denoted by qi(xi; xj ; h) for rm i:
In the rst stage, the objective of rm i is given by
max
xi
qi(xi; xj ; h) [a  b(qi(xi; xj ; h) + qj(xi; xj ; h))]  (c  xi)qi(xi; xj ; h)(1  h)  x
2
i
2
; (5)
where the last term in equation (5) denotes the cost of R&D.
Due to the symmetry of the game, we obtain a (unique) symmetric subgame-perfect equi-
librium. Denote the equilibrium variables by x(h) and q(h).
Lemma 2 Assume (A1) holds. Then, for all 0 < h < 1, there is a unique symmetric subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game under the performance standard, with R&D and output
levels respectively given by
x(h) =
4(1  h)[a  c(1  h)]
9b   4(1  h)2 and q(h) =
3[a  c(1  h)]
9b   4(1  h)2 :
Moreover, 0 < x(h) < c and 0 < q(h):
The next section compares the solutions to the two-stage games under the two policy instru-
ments.
3.3 Emission versus performance standards in the two-stage game
The aim of this section is to compare the emission and performance standards for the two-
stage game formulation in terms of the equilibrium incentives to invest in environmental R&D,
and to produce a higher output. In addition, the comparison is extended to the resulting social
welfare.
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As a way to provide an intuitive account of the forces at work in the two models, Montero
(2002) assesses the incentives to invest in environmental R&D by means of two e¤ects: the
direct (cost-minimizing) e¤ect and the strategic e¤ect. The direct e¤ect refers to the savings
associated with the adoption of a new abatement technology, and is increasing in the amount
of abatement. The strategic e¤ect accounts for the fact that one rms R&D investment lowers
the rivals output, market share and prot, through the usual business-stealing e¤ect of Cournot
competition.
Montero (2002) nds that the direct e¤ect is larger under the emission standard, while the
strategic e¤ect is larger under the performance standard. As the investment in R&D increases,
the abatement cost decreases, leading to a rise in the level of output. According to Montero, this
leads to an increase in the amount of emissions that are allowed under the performance standard.
Under the emission standard, the pollution constraint is una¤ected by the change in output.
Thus, a higher level of emissions must be abated under an inexible emission standard, which
requires a higher abatement cost. This gives a rm a greater incentive to invest more in R&D
under the emission standard, where greater savings from abatement are anticipated. On the
other hand, the increase in the level of output induced by the lower cost of abatement enables a
rm to achieve a larger market share and prot under the performance standard. Consequently,
as the two e¤ects move in opposite directions, the outcome of Monteros comparison of the R&D
incentives under the emission and performance standards is ambiguous.
Exploiting the simple tractable formulation of the present paper, the main result of this
section adds to Monteros (2002) ndings by providing a complete characterization of the com-
parison between the propensities for higher R&D and output generated by each of the two policy
instruments. A welfare comparison then follows.
Proposition 3 contains a complete description of the parameter regions (including the values
of h) for which each instrument is superior to the other, in terms of generating more R&D
investment and more output, respectively.
To ensure a meaningful comparison of the incentives to invest in R&D under both regulatory
instruments, we assume that the regulator chooses the emission constraints e and h so that
the nal level of emissions is the same for the two instruments. In other words, if q(h) is the
equilibrium output produced under the performance standard in the two-stage game, e is chosen
10
so that e = q(h)h.13 Dene the thresholds h , 5(9b) (9b+16)a=c9b 16a=c and h0 ,
5a 9bc c
4a c :
14
Proposition 3 Under Assumption (A1), the R&D/output comparison of the two standards is:
a) Let a=c < 9b=16: Then,
(i) if a=c < 4; a performance standard leads to more R&D.
(ii) if a=c > 5 9b9b+16 ; an emission standard leads to more R&D.
(iii) If 4 < a=c < 5 9b9b+16 and h < (>)h; a performance (emission) standard leads to more R&D.
b) Let a=c > 9b=16: Then,
(i) if a=c > 4; an emission standard leads to more R&D.
(ii) if a=c < 5 9b9b+16 ; a performance standard leads to more R&D.
(iii) If 5 9b9b+16 < a=c < 4 and h < (>)h, an emission (performance) standard leads to more
R&D.
c) (i) If a=c < (9b + 1)=5; the performance standard leads to more output.
(ii) If a=c > (9b+1)=5 and h < (>)h0, an emission (performance) standard gives more output.
Proposition 3 provides a complete characterization of the comparison between the propen-
sities for abatement R&D and for industry output that are generated by the two standards.
The comparison turns out to be quite complex, with neither of the two instruments emerging as
uniformly superior. Instead, the comparison is highly parameter-dependent, with the following
conclusions nevertheless essentially holding. To state these, we shall take a=c as being a measure
of market size (for xed initial unit cost c), and  as being a measure of the cost of abatement
R&D.15
Considering parts (a) and (b) together, the main message is as follows. When R&D is
su¢ ciently costly (at xed market size), a performance standard generates more R&D. On the
other hand, when market size is su¢ ciently large (at xed unit cost of R&D), an emission
standard generates more R&D. For modest levels of market size and R&D cost, the outcome of
the comparison is less clear-cut, although similar forces appear to be at work here too.
Considering part (c), the e¤ects on equilibrium industry output are qualitatively similar to
those on R&D. A large market size favors an emission standard, while costly abatement R&D
13As in Proposition 1, we additionally require that 0 < e < 3(a c)
9b 1 ; to ensure that 0 < x(e) < c and 0 < e < q(e).
14Under the conditions of Proposition 3 (a)(iii) and (b)(iii), it is useful to note that 0 < h < 1:
15A convenient feature of the quadratic cost function is that rms will always choose to undertake striclty
positive levels of R&D even when  is very high.
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favors a performance standard.
The following example is a simple illustration of the results of Proposition 3.
Example 1: Suppose that b = c = 1, and a = 2:5. Table 1 gives the threshold values of the
performance standard for which Proposition 3 holds. These levels are given by h and hc, and
are computed for some feasible values of the parameter denoting a unit cost of R&D, :
Variable hab hc hab hc hab hc
( = 1:15) ( = 1:20) ( = 1:80)
Threshold 0.48 0.13 0.45 0.08 -0.02 -0.52
Table 1: Thresholds in Proposition 3 for b = c = 1, a = 2:5 and di¤erent values of .
Here,  has been chosen so that 9bc   16a < 0 holds (i.e., case (b) of Proposition 3 applies).
Thus, Table 1 shows that for a low cost of R&D ( = 1:15), more R&D is undertaken and more
output is produced under the emission standard if 0 < h < 0:48 or if 0 < h < 0:13, respectively.
The case with  = 1:20 can be interpreted similarly.
For  = 1:80, the interpretation is as follows. Since both thresholds are negative, hab =  0:02
and hc =  0:52, the second condition on h cannot hold in Proposition 3 (a)-(c), since h is always
> 0. Then Proposition 3 (a)-(b) says that the performance standard always generates a lower
(resp., higher) investment in R&D if 9bc   16a > 0 (resp., if 9bc   16a > 0). Part (c) says
that the performance standard yields a higher output.
An analogous analysis can be undertaken for changes in other parameters of interest.
Proposition 3 claries that neither of the two command-and-control instruments is (uni-
formly) superior in generating the incentives to invest in environmental R&D or to produce
more output. For each of the latter criteria, there
In light of this ambiguous outcome, a natural question to ask is whether comparing the
resulting social welfare levels always leads to a clear-cut conclusion. Assuming that e = q(h)h
and dening equilibrium welfare as
Z 2q(h)
0
P (t)dt  2[c  x(h)]q(h)(1  h)  s(2hq(h))
2
2
  [x(h)]2;
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we nd that the answer to this question is negative, as demonstrated by means of the following
counterexample.
Example 2: Consider our two-stage game formulation with the values of parameters b; c; s; ;
and a being xed, so that b = c = s = 1,  = 1:8, and a = 1:2. The resulting values of equilibrium
welfare together with R&D investment, output, and nal emissions per rm under both policy
instruments are shown in Table 2, where h = 0:1 and h = 0:3.
Variable e.s. p.s. e.s. p.s.
h = 0:10 h = 0:30
R&D per rm 0.056 0.083 0.024 0.098
Individual output 0.085 0.125 0.075 0.190
Welfare 0.047 0.050 0.126 0.120
Final emissions per rm 0.013 0.013 0.057 0.057
Table 2: Variables of interest for di¤erent values of h and b = c = s = 1,  = 1:8 a = 1:2.
The choice of h = 0:1 and h = 0:3 in Table 2 is not random. In particular, for h = 0:1, we
demonstrate that the performance standard generates a higher level of welfare than the emission
standard.16 However, for h = 0:3, we are able to show the opposite - the emission standard is
now superior in generating a higher level of welfare.17 Thus, this counterexample demonstrates
that the welfare comparison between the two instruments depends critically on the values of
parameter h.
As to welfare, unfortunately, a complete characterization of parameter regions for which one
instrument is welfare superior to the other (in the spirit of Proposition 3 for R&D and output
levels) does not appear tractable, even for our convenient quadratic formulation.
The absence of a clear-cut conclusion for the welfare comparison in the two-stage game
provides a further motivation to investigate a three-stage game scenario, in which social welfare
16At h = 0, welfare under the emission and performance standards coincides, but the derivative of the welfare
function with respect to h is higher under the performance standard. In particular, one obtaines W p0(0)  
W e0(0) = 2(a c)(9bc 4a)
(4 9b)2 > 0; where W
p0(0) and W e0(0) denote the derivatives of the welfare function under the
performance and emission standards, respectively.
17We nd that the performance standard generates higher welfare than the emission standard for h < 0:22.
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is endogenously determined. To this end, we integrate the regulator as an active player in the
game and postulate social welfare as his objective function. The next section analyzes this
scenario.
4 The three-stage game
In contrast to the two-stage game, in which emission and performance standards were set in
an exogenous manner, this section analyzes the socially optimal pollution levels arising under
these policy instruments. Thus, the game under consideration now comprises three instead of
two stages. Under each policy instrument, the additional stage (at time 0) allows the regulator to
select the level of emissions that maximizes social welfare before the rms make their sequential
decisions about their levels of R&D investment and their outputs. Hence, the pollution standards
are thereby determined endogenously. The regulator sets the pollution level by taking into
account the environmental damage that this level will be associated with, thus anticipating
rmsequilibrium reactions. The remaining two stages (at time 1 and 2) are the same as those
considered in the two-stage game: the rst stage involves rms simultaneously choosing their
R&D investments, while the second stage is the Cournot competition phase.
For this three-stage game we shall require throughout that, in addition to assumption (A1),
the following assumption holds:
(A2): 9b+ 8s < 18bs; a < 2s(a  c); 9bc < 8s(a  c); 9bc   6s(a  c) < a:
This assumption ensures that the solutions to the three-stage games are economically meaningful,
yielding positive levels of abatement cost and output and ensuring that the level of emissions is
below that of output.18
4.1 Emission standard
Recall that the two-stage equilibrium values of R&D investment, x(e), and output, q(e),
depend on the emission target, e, which was set exogenously by the regulator. In contrast,
by pursuing the objective of social welfare maximization, the regulator derives the emission cap
18Notice that a < 2s(a  c) in (A2) implies a > c in (A1), for the positive values of the parameters. Yet, we
list a > c as a separate assumption because this weaker version is su¢ cient for some proofs (see the Appendix).
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endogenously in the three-stage game. In particular, he solves the following welfare maximization
problem:
max
e
Z 2q(e)
0
P (t)dt  2[c  x(e)][q(e)  e]  s(2e)
2
2
  [x(e)]2; (6)
where the industry emissions are equal to E = 2e.
The rst term in equation (6) corresponds to the consumer surplus, while the second term
reects the costs of abatement incurred by both rms. The remaining expressions, s(2e)
2
2 and
[x(e)]2; capture the damage and the total cost of R&D, respectively.
Given the two-stage equilibrium values of R&D investment, x(e), and output, q(e) (recall
Lemma 1), the regulators problem reduces to
max
e

e2(9b+ 8s  18bs) + e(18bc   8a) + 4(a  c)2
9b   4

:
The solution to this problem is given by Lemma 4, in which the variables of interest carry an
additional index, (), to distinguish this solution from the solution to the two-stage game.
Lemma 4 Under assumptions (A1)-(A2), there is a unique symmetric equilibrium for the
three-stage game under the emission standard, which entails the social welfare maximizing level
of emission constraint, R&D levels, and outputs respectively given by
e =
4a  9bc
9b+ 8s  18bs; x
 =
9bc  8s(a  c)
9b+ 8s  18bs; and q
 =
3a  6s(a  c)
9b+ 8s  18bs:
Moreover, 0 < x < c and 0 < e < q.
The next section provides a solution to the three-stage game under the performance standard.
4.2 Performance standard
In the three-stage game, the regulator chooses 0 < h < 1 at the initial stage (time 0) as
to maximize social welfare given the equilibrium values of the two-stage game, x(h) and q(h),
characterized in Proposition 2. Thus, the regulator solves the following welfare maximization
problem
max
h
Z 2q(h)
0
P (t)dt  2[c  x(h)]q(h)(1  h)  s[2hq(h)]
2
2
  [x(h)]2: (7)
Applying results obtained in Proposition 2, the regulators objective reduces to (upon a long
computation)
max
h

2[a  c(1  h)]2 [9(2b  h2s)  8(h  1)2]
[4(1  h)2   9b]2

:
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Unfortunately, the solution to the regulators problem is analytically non-tractable.19 Hence, we
compute the solution for a particular set of parameters. Specically, we distinguish three cases;
case one, in which the value of parameter a; the consumerswillingness to pay, varies; case two,
in which the value of ; the unit cost of R&D, varies; and case three, in which the extent of
damage, as measured by parameter s, varies. For each case, the remaining variables are kept
xed. In so doing, we are able to compare the equilibrium outcomes of the three-stage game
under both policy instruments, while maintaining the robustness of the results to the parameter
specication. The next section discusses the outcome of the comparison.
4.3 Comparison of equilibria
This section compares the equilibria of the three-stage game under both policy instruments
in terms of the resulting R&D levels and outputs. However, due to the non-tractability of the
solution to the three-stage game under the performance standard, the comparison is provided
for restricted parameter values. In particular, for this section, a simplifying assumption that
b = c = 1 is maintained. Nonetheless, we shall have more to say about the generality of our
results below.
The equilibrium variables under the emission standard are given by Proposition 4. Under
the performance standard, the solutions and qualitative characteristics are obtained computa-
tionally. In both cases, the outcomes of the games are symmetric and carry the superscript e
or p, for the emission and performance standards, respectively. Below, W denotes total welfare,
e stands for the equilibrium level of pollution under the emission standard, and h denotes the
equilibrium level of ratio of emission to output under the performance standard.
4.3.1 Varying parameter a
In this section we compare the levels of R&D investment, output and welfare obtained under
both policy instruments in order to identify which of the two regimes is superior. Table 3
provides such a comparison for di¤erent values of the market size, a. The abbreviation e.s.
stands for emission standard, and p.s. for performance standard.
Table 3 demonstrates that an increase in the market size, a, encourages rms to produce more.
19There are four roots in total, however, two of them are imaginary ones and one real root induces zero output.
The restant root constitutes as the only relevant solution to the maximization problem of the regulator.
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Variable e.s. p.s. e.s. p.s. e.s. p.s. e.s. p.s.
(a = 2:3) (a = 2:5) (a = 3:1) (a = 3:3)
Standard 0.43 0.65 0.35 0.59 0.11 0.31 0.03 0.12
R&D per rm 0.14 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.78 0.57 0.94 0.82
Individual output 0.48 0.68 0.60 0.73 0.96 0.94 1.08 1.05
Welfare 1.26 1.37 1.55 1.67 2.80 2.84 3.34 3.35
Final emissions per rm 0.43 0.44 0.35 0.43 0.11 0.29 0.03 0.13
Abatement per rm 0.05 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.85 0.65 1.05 0.92
Table 3: Solution to the three-stage game for b = c = s = 1,  = 1:5 and chosen values of a.
The increasing level of output, q, leads to a higher level of pollution in the environment, which
negatively a¤ects social welfare. Thus, the regulator concerned with social welfare maximization
makes the pollution constraint more stringent, which is manifested through a drop in the nal
emissions per rm (the fth row in Table 3). Since the output increases and the pollution
constraint is stricter (lower), the number of abatement units rises (see the sixth row of Table 3).
Therefore, the abatement cost rises too, providing rms with more incentives to invest in R&D
(the second row in Table 3). Finally, the level of equilibrium welfare increases (the forth row in
Table 3).
These results are complemented by Proposition 5, which provides a comparison of the emis-
sion and performance standards for all relevant values of parameter a. These values are chosen
to ensure that our results are economically meaningful. In particular, the lower bound on a,
a = 2:25, has been chosen to ensure that under the emission instrument the optimal output level
is greater than the emissions level, hence, qe > e. The upper bound of a, a = 3:375, guarantees
that the optimal emission constraints, e and h, are non-negative. The constants  = 1:5 and
s = 1 have been chosen so as to lead to a representative outcome.
Proposition 5 Let b = c = s = 1 and  = 1:5. Then
a) for 2:25 < a < 2:433; xp > xe; and qp > qe;
b) for 2:433 < a < 2:979; xp < xe; and qp > qe;
c) for 2:979 < a < 3:375; xp < xe; and qp < qe;
d) for 2:25 < a < 3:375; W p > W e ;
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e) e and h are decreasing in a: 20
Proposition 5 demonstrates that, under the present specication, the performance standard
leads to both a higher R&D and a higher output when the market size is small (part a), while
the opposite holds for the large market size (part c). For the medium market size (part b), the
comparison is mixed: the performance standard leads in terms of output but trails in terms of
R&D. As to an intuitive account of the forces at work here, one can recall the direct e¤ect and
the strategic e¤ect invoked by Montero (2002) and summarized above.
Specically, following an increase in market size (from a = 2:3 to a = 2:5 and from a = 3:1
to a = 3:3), which in turn induces an increase in the level of output, the regulator concerned
with social welfare maximization reduces the amount of pollution allowed under both policy
instruments (as shown in the fth row in Table 3). Since, under the performance standard, the
pollution constraint that maximizes welfare is set as a percentage of output, this constraint is
more exible than the emission standard. Consequently, the nal emissions allowed per rm are
larger, while the number of units abated per rm becomes lower under the performance standard.
In contrast, the production decision of an individual rm does not directly a¤ect the pollution
constraint under the emission standard. This intrusive nature of the emission standard enables
a rm to generate higher cost savings from abatement (the second row in Table 3 for medium
and large market sizes), providing it with more incentives to invest in R&D. This outcome
corresponds to what Montero (2002) refers to as the direct e¤ect. Since the abatement cost
is lower under the performance standard, a rm can increase its market share and prot more
under this instrument than under the emission standard. Thus, according to Montero (2002),
the performance standard is favored for having a stronger strategic e¤ect. The conjunction of
these two e¤ects leads to the mixed outcome reported in Proposition 5.
All together then, the comparison between the two instruments in terms of R&D and output
appears as a draw, but the main message of Proposition 5 is that we know the parameter regions
for which each instrument is superior for each of two dimensions.
In contrast, we now have the clear-cut outcome that the equilibrium level of welfare remains
consistently higher under the performance standard. Postponing a conclusion on the comparison
at hand to the end of this section, we note now that the outcome of part d stands in apparent
contradiction to the result of part c. Nonetheless, given the many ine¢ ciencies that are usually
20At a = 3:375; e = h = 0; xe = xp = c = 1; qe = qp = 1:125; and W e =W p = 3:5625.
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associated with strategic behavior, one can reconcile the ndings of parts c and d by postulating
that the emission standard leads to excessive levels of R&D and output from a social standpoint.
Similar conclusions have appeared in specic instances in the industrial organization literature
on strategic R&D (see e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1983).
The next section analyzes the robustness of the results of Proposition 5 when parameters a
and s are held xed.
4.3.2 Varying parameter 
This section examines how changes in the cost of R&D, ; a¤ect the comparison of R&D
investment, output and welfare under the emission and performance standards, for the three-
stage game with a and s held constant.
Table 4 on the next page illustrates the results.
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Variable e.s. p.s. e.s. p.s. e.s. p.s.
( = 1:15) ( = 1:20) ( = 1:80)
Standard 0.09 0.50 0.17 0.52 0.40 0.62
R&D per rm 0.81 0.43 0.65 0.39 0.19 0.21
Individual output 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.56 0.73
Welfare 1.64 1.70 1.61 1.69 1.53 1.66
Final emissions per rm 0.09 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.40 0.45
Abatement per rm 0.68 0.37 0.55 0.36 0.16 0.28
Table 4: Solution to the three-stage game for b = c = s = 1, a = 2:5 and chosen values of .
Table 4 shows that an increase in the cost of R&D negatively a¤ects R&D investment, output,
emissions abated per rm, and welfare. The rising cost of R&D discourages rms from producing,
because with the lower R&D investment, the abatement cost is higher. Consequently, the level
of output drops. To recover some of the consumer surplus, the regulator increases the allowed
level of pollution (measured by the nal emissions per rm in the fth row in Table 4). This,
combined with the lower level of production results in lower emissions abated per rm (the sixth
row in Table 4). Despite this e¤ort of the regulator, social welfare decreases. The reason is
that a higher  not only leads to a higher cost of R&D, but also to a higher level of damage,
caused by permitting rms to pollute more. Thus, the regulator faces a clear trade-o¤ between
increasing the consumer surplus and decreasing the environmental damage to society.
These and further results are summarized in Proposition 6, in which the lower bound of
R&D cost,  = 1:11; guarantees that the emission constraint, e, is non-negative. The values
a = 2:5 and s = 1 are chosen for illustrative purposes.
Proposition 6 Let b = c = s = 1 and a = 2:5. Then
a) for 1:11 <  < 1:18; xe > xp; and qe > qp;
b) for 1:18 <  < 1:67; xe > xp; and qe < qp;
c) for 1:67 < ; xe < xp; and qe < qp;
d) W p > W e for  > 1:11;
e) e and h are increasing in :
Proposition 6 shows that an increase in the cost of R&D investment has a more pronounced
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impact on the levels of output and R&D under the emission standard. Whereas output a¤ects
the pollution constraint optimally set by the welfare maximizing regulator under the performance
standard, under the emission standard the output decision of a rm has no direct impact on
the pollution constraint set by the social planner. Thus, when R&D becomes more expensive, a
rm reduces its output to decrease the cost of abatement under the intrusive emission standard.
Under the more exible performance standard, maintaining a high level of production enables
a rm to decrease the abatement cost. Consequently, when the cost of R&D rises, the levels
of output and R&D investment under the performance standard become higher than under the
emission standard.
Proposition 6 also reveals the lack of a systematic result for the comparison of R&D invest-
ment and output under both instruments across the relevant ranges of parameter  (see parts
a-c). In close analogy with the previous result, the comparison between the two instruments
concludes with a draw. In contrast, an unambiguous welfare result is obtained (part d). The
performance standard is superior in generating a higher level of welfare, in complete accordance
with the result obtained in the previous section.
To verify this important result, we next consider the impact that a change in the extent of
environmental damage, as measured by parameter s, has on the welfare comparison for the two
policy instruments.
4.3.3 Varying s
Clearly, the extent of environmental damage plays an important role in the social welfare
maximization problem of the regulator. Hence, this section examines how changes in the extent
of environmental damage, as measured by parameter s, a¤ect the comparison of the equilibrium
levels of R&D investment, output and welfare under the emission and performance standards,
for the three-stage game with other parameters held constant.
Table 5 on the next page illustrates the results.
Since society su¤ers when environmental damage increases (the fourth row in Table 5), the
regulator reduces the level of emissions allowed (the fth row in Table 5). This leads to a higher
level of pollution abated (the sixth row in Table 5). By investing more in R&D, rms are able
to reduce the increased abatement cost.
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Variable e.s. p.s. e.s. p.s.
(s = 1) (s = 2:7)
Standard 0.43 0.65 0.10 0.22
R&D per rm 0.14 0.21 0.45 0.43
Individual output 0.48 0.68 0.58 0.62
Welfare 1.26 1.37 1.11 1.15
Final emissions per rm 0.43 0.44 0.10 0.14
Abatement per rm 0.05 0.24 0.48 0.48
Table 5: Solution to the three-stage game for b = c = 1;  = 1:5, a = 2:3 and chosen values of s.
An increase in environmental damage clearly a¤ects the level of production under both policy in-
struments. Interestingly, whereas output increases under the emission standard, output declines
under the performance standard. The reason for the latter e¤ect is that damage, which the
regulator wants to reduce, depends on the level of production. Thus, to reduce damage under
the performance standard, one must decrease output. Unlike under the performance standard,
output under the emission standard increases, since output for this instrument does not enter
the term capturing the environmental damage. Proposition 7 summarizes these ndings for
a = 2:3. The values of parameters a, b, c, and  in Proposition 7 have been xed for the purpose
of illustrating the results.
Proposition 7 Let b = c = 1,  = 1:5, a = 2:3 and s > 0:957.21 Then
a) if 0:957 < s < 1:282, xp > xe, otherwise, xe > xp;
b) qp > qe;
c) W p > W e;
d) e and h are decreasing in s.
Proposition 7 shows that our results are economically meaningful for s > 0:957. For this range
of parameter s, we obtain two key ndings. First, we show that, as in the previous examinations,
the equilibrium level of welfare is higher under the performance standard than under the emission
standard. Second, our results suggest that output is higher under the performance standard that
21s > 0:957 is required to satisfy (A2), given the parameter specication with a = 2:3.
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under the emission standard. By means of Table 6 and Proposition 8, we show that the latter
result is robust to our parameter specication, but, unlike the welfare outcome, it does not hold
generally.
Variable e.s. p.s. e.s. p.s.
(s = 0:60) (s = 1)
Standard 0.46 0.79 0.11 0.31
R&D per rm 0.45 0.18 0.78 0.57
Individual output 0.85 0.98 0.96 0.94
Welfare 2.84 3.05 2.80 2.84
Final emissions per rm 0.46 0.77 0.11 0.29
Abatement per rm 0.39 0.21 0.85 0.65
Table 6: Solution to the three-stage game for b = c = 1;  = 1:5, a = 3:1 and chosen values of s.
Table 6 demonstrates the e¤ect that an increase in the market size, a, from a = 2:3 (Table 5)
to a = 3:1, has on the equilibrium levels of R&D investment, output and welfare. Particularly,
it indicates that for a large market size, the level of output generated under the performance
standard no longer exceeds that under the emission standard. The intuition behind this result
has already been given in Section 4.3.1., which investigates how changes in parameter a a¤ect the
equilibrium levels of R&D investment, output, and welfare, when other parameters, including s,
are held constant. Proposition 8 provides an overview of the key results obtained in this section,
assuming that a = 3:1, while s varies.
Proposition 8 Let b = c = 1,  = 1:5, a = 3:1 and s > 0:55.22 Then
a) xe > xp;
b) if 0:55 < s < 0:79, qp > qe and qp < qe otherwise;
c) W p > W e;
d) e and h are decreasing in s.
Proposition 8 validates the previous results we have obtained regarding the equilibrium welfare
comparison between the two policy instruments, according to which, the performance standard
generates a higher level of social welfare.
22s > 0:55 is required to satisfy (A2), given the parameter specication, with a = 3:1.
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Although a complete analytical comparison that would generalize the four Propositions
(Propositions 5-8) to all relevant parameter regions does not appear tractable, we managed
to conrm this result via thorough numerical simulations covering the entire parameter space.
Since welfare is the most natural indicator on which to base the comparison for social and
regulatory purposes, we conclude on the basis of Propositions 5, 6, 7, and 8 that the performance
standard is the superior regulatory instrument of the two. Indeed, as argued above, the absence
of a clear-cut comparison for R&D and output levels is a secondary consideration.
5 Conclusion
This paper has extended the analysis of environmental R&D incentives in Cournot markets
by Montero (2002) in two key respects. First, we analyze the incentives to R&D provided
by two command-and-control instruments, emission and performance standards, by focusing
on the standard linear specication of Cournot oligopoly. For Monteros two-stage game, this
enables us to derive many relevant full-edged equilibrium properties, including a complete
characterization of the parameter regions for which each standard is superior according to the
R&D and industry output criteria, respectively. We also establish the abscence of a clear-
cut conclusion for the comparison of the two policy instruments in terms of social welfare, by
providing specic examples showing that the comparison can go either way. Thus, for the two
stage games associated with the two command-and-control instruments, we provide a complete
characterization of the comparative performance of the two instruments.
In an attempt to address an important and natural issue not considered by Montero (2002),
the second objective of this paper is to endogenize the regulatory standard for the two games
analysed in this paper. To do so, for each of the two instruments, we consider a three-stage
game with the planner maximizing social welfare in an initial stage, followed by the previous
two-stage game. This extended game leads to an unambiguous result that equilibrium welfare
is higher under the socially optimal performance standard. Thus, with endogenous regulatory
targets, we obtain the clear-cut conclusion that the performance standard is welfare superior to
the emission standard.
Contrasting the two di¤erent types of analysis conducted here and their associated conclu-
sions, we conrm once again the importance of integrating welfare analysis into the study of
pollution regulation in imperfectly competitive markets. Indeed, a clear-cut conclusion that
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would hold uniformly for all feasible regulatory targets is thus perhaps simply too much to ex-
pect. Instead, it is certainly of interest to learn that a performance standard is the way to go
for the most relevant target, naturally dened as the socially optimal level.
6 Appendix
This section contains the proofs and computations for all the results of the paper.
Proof of Lemma 1. In the last stage, rm i solves the optimization problem (2), with rst order
condition (or FOC)
 2bqi + a  bqj   c+ xi = 0: (8)
The reaction function of rm i is given by
qi(qj ; xi) =
8><>:
a c+xi
2b  
qj
2 ; if
a c+xi
b  qj
0; otherwise.
The objective function is strictly concave, thus, a unique maximum is attained (the second-
order condition (SOC) is  2b < 0). Solving simultaneously the two non-zero reaction functions
of the rms yields (for i 6= j)
qi(xi; xj) =
a  c+ 2xi   xj
3b
: (9)
In the rst stage, rm i chooses the level of R&D, xi, given xj , e and qi(xi; xj) in equation (9).
The FOC of (3) is then given by
2
3b
[ 2bqi(xi; xj) + a  bqj(xi; xj)  c+ xi] +
4
3
qi(xi; xj)  e  xi = 0: (10)
The rst term in (10) vanishes by the FOC in (8). By (A1), 9b > 8, the SOC holds.
Plugging equation (9) into equation (10) and using the fact that the rms are symmetric and
subject to the same standard e, we get that every rm invests
x(e) =
4(a  c)  9be
9b   4 (11)
in R&D, yielding an output of
q(e) =
3(a  c)  3e
9b   4 : (12)
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Since e is selected exogenously, we want to choose values that are economically meaningful.
In particular, we want 0 < x(e) < c and 0 < e < q(e); we show that 0 < e < 3(a c)9b 1 is su¢ cient
to guarantee that these two inequalities hold.
First notice that e, such that 0 < e < 3(a c)9b 1 ; implies that
(a c)
9b 1 < x(e) =
4(a c) 9be
9b 4 <
4(a c)
9b 4
by multiplying the rst inequality by  9b, adding 4(a   c) and dividing by 9b   4; which is
positive by (A1). Assumption (A1) implies that the left hand side of the second inequality is
strictly positive, hence, 0 < x(e). The proof of x(e) < c also follows from (A1); to see it rewrite
9bc > 4a as 9bc  4c > 4(a  c); which implies that 4(a c)9b 4 < c, hence, that x(e) < c:
To show that e < q(e) (which immediately implies that 0 < q(e)) consider the following
implications:
e < 3(a c)9b 1 ; hence, (9b   1)e < 3(a  c) by (A1) and, further, 9be  4e+ 3e < 3(a  c),
thus, (9b  4)e < 3(a  c)  3e; consequently leading to e < 3(a c) 3e9b 4 = q(e). This completes
the proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 2. In the last stage, rms solve problem (4), with FOC:
a  2bqi   bqj   (c  xi)(1  h) = 0; (13)
with SOC  2b < 0.
Solving simultaneously for the positive parts of the reaction curves of the rms, gives us
qi(xi; xj ; h) =
(2xi   xj   c)(1  h) + a
3b
: (14)
Using equation (14) in problem (5) helps derive the following FOC for the rst stage:
2
3b
(1 h)[a 2bqi(xi; xj ; h) bqj(xi; xj ; h) (c xi)(1 h)]+
4
3
qi(xi; xj ; h)(1 h) xi = 0; (15)
with SOC 8(1  h)2=(9b)   < 0, which holds by (A1), 8 < 9b, and 0 < h < 1.
The rst term in equation (15) vanishes by FOC (13). By the symmetry of the model,
equations (14) and (15) imply our result, x(h) = 4(1 h)[c(1 h) a]
4(1 h)2 9b and q(h) =
3[c(1 h) a]
4(1 h)2 9b :
Note that the following assumption:
(A) 8(1   h)2 < 9b, a > c(1   h) and 9bc > 4a(1   h) for all 0 < h < 1, guarantees that
0 < x(h) < c and q(h) > 0. It is easy to verify that 0 < h < 1 and (A1) (8 < 9b, a > c
and 9bc > 4a ) imply (A), since the lowest side of the (positive) inequalities is multiplied by
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a number between 0 and 1. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3. To avoid confusion between the equilibrium variables, we add the
superscript e for the equilibrium under the emission standard, and p for the equilibrium under
the performance standard. Thus, xe(e) and qe(e) correspond to x(e) and q(e) in Proposition 1,
respectively; and xp(h) and qp(h) correspond to x(h) and q(h) in Proposition 2, respectively.
Now, let us x e = hqp(h), so that both instruments generate the same level of emissions.
Hence, e is a function of h and we can write xe in terms of h, xe(e) = xe(hqp(h)) = xe(h).
Similarly, we can write qe as a function of h (this feature will be used in part c).
For parts a and b, we nd the values of h for which xe(h) = xp(h) holds. For these values, we
can analyze the functions of interest to see which function takes a larger value on given intervals.
It turns out that there are only two solutions: h1 = 0, which is trivial and implies zero level of
emissions, and hab =
(45c 9a)b 16a
9bc 16a , which is the threshold of interest. Since there are only two
roots, we analyze the slopes of xe(h) and xp(h) around zero, to prove our result. We have to
distinguish between two cases, which depend on the sign of 9bc   16a.
a) Suppose that 9bc   16a > 0. Two possibilities arise; either hab > 0 or hab < 0. First, let
us assume that hab > 0. Since, by assumption, its denominator is positive, the numerator must
be positive as well, i.e., (45c  9a)b   16a > 0. Further, it can be shown that xe0(0)  xp0(0) =
  (45c 9a)b 16a
(4 9b)2 is negative by the statement above, thus, x
p(h) is above xe(h) for all 0 < h < hab.
A similar argument shows that xe0(0) xp0(0) > 0 when hab < 0, which implies that xe(h) > xp(h)
for all 0 < h < 1. To complete our result, it su¢ ces to show that xe0(hab)  xp0(hab) 6= 0, which
holds by our assumptions, since xe0(hab)  xp0(hab) = ((45c 9a)b 16a)(16a 9bc)
2
9b( 64+9b)( 4+9b)( 4a2+9bc2) .
b) Now suppose that 9bc   16a < 0. The proof of this part is analogous to that in part a,
and is therefore omitted.
c) This proof follows the same strategy as the one implemented in parts a and b. We look
for h that satises the equality qe(e) = qp(h), with e = hqp(h). Again two solutions are ob-
tained; the trivial root h1 = 0; and the root of interest, hc =
9bc+c 5a
c 4a . Note that (A1) implies
that hc < 1, yet, it remains to establish whether its value is positive or negative. First, let
us suppose that hc > 0 and analyze the slopes of qe(h) and qp(h) at h1 = 0. If hc > 0, then
9bc + c   5a < 0, by (A1), a > c. The reader can verify that further rearrangments lead
to qe0(0)   qh0(0) =  3(9bc+c 5a)
(4 9b)2 , which is positive by the assumption hc > 0 and  > 0.
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Hence, qe(h) is always above qh(h) (for all 0 < h < hc). On the other hand, if hc < 0, then
9bc + c  5a > 0 and qe0(0)  qh0(0) < 0; thus, qh(h) is above qe(h) for all 0 < h < 1. The fact
that qe0(hc)  qh0(hc) =   3( 4a+c)
2(9bcg+c 5a)
( 4+9b)( 1+36b)( 4a2+9bc2) di¤ers from zero (given our assumptions
in any case), completes our proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Given the results in Lemma 1, we solve the problem of the regulator
presented in equation (6). Here, the FOC is given by the following equation:
dq(e)
de
[a  2bq(e)  c+ x(e)] + dx(e)
de
[q(e)  e  x(e)] + c  x(e)  2se = 0: (16)
The SOC of this problem is 2(9b+8s 18bs)9b 4 , which is negative by (A1) and (A2). Using the
FOCs (8) and (10), equation (16) becomes
bq(e)
dq(e)
de
  1
3
q(e)
dx(e)
de
+ c  x(e)  2se = 0: (17)
Combining equations (11), (12) and (17), leads to the results outlined in Lemma 4. (A1)
and (A2) guarantee that in equilibrium, 0 < x < c and 0 < e < q. 
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